Footnotes

¹Interpolation: “Desiring something etc     . [quoting Peter Lombard ad loc.]. Concerning the prologue of the first book there are five questions. The first is about the necessity of this doctrine: whether it is necessary for man in this present state that there be some supernaturally inspired doctrine for him. The second concerns the genus of the formal cause of the same, and it is: whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture. The third pertains to the genus of the material cause, and it is: whether theology is about God as about its first subject. The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of final cause, and the fourth is: whether theology is practical; the fifth: whether a practical science is so called per se from order to praxis and end.”

²Text marked by Scotus with the sign a.

³Note by Scotus: “In this question note a, b, c for the principle; next, for the difficulties, d, e, f, g; they are done in the second question [n.95]. Note, a is valid for distinction 3 [I d.3 p.1], and c for question 1 [ibid., qq.1-2]; b and the following are common in supernatural matters; d, e for the question about the science of theology for us [n.124].”

⁴Text marked by Scotus with the sign b.

⁵Interpolation: “and so they honor it more.”

⁶Text marked by Scotus with the sign c.

⁷Text marked by Scotus with the sign f

⁸Text marked by Scotus with the sign d.

⁹Interpolation (in place of “therefore.. .understood first”): “therefore we can naturally understand them, because, from Physics 1, the most common things are understood first by us, and also because they are as it were the doorways in[to] the house, Metaphysics 2.1.993b4-5.”

¹⁰Interpolation: “And thus is this second part of the minor proved.”

¹¹These arguments are derived variously from Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, though primarily from the latter.

¹²Note by Scotus: “This is something believed.”

¹³Interpolation: “This is plain from the descent of a heavy object downward, which descent is an act of the heavy object with respect to the center and end.”

¹⁴Note by Scotus: “This proceeds of contingent things; therefore it does not proceed of knowable things.”

¹⁵Note by Scotus: “This is something believed.”

¹⁶A proof from effects to cause, Posterior Analytics 1.13.78a22-b34, as opposed to a ‘proof-why’, which is from causes to effects.

¹⁷Note by Scotus: “I concede that the end which is the final cause is known, and this in the respect in which it is final cause, and that it is known in like manner as the efficient cause is known in the respect in which it must necessarily be the first efficient cause” [n.29].

¹⁸Interpolation: “Or Augustine means that in nature it is a power for receiving. But it cannot be reduced to act by nature.”

¹⁹Scotus left the space for ‘9.7’ blank.

²⁰Interpolation: “But if one opposes to this that, if material quiddity is the first and adequate object of the intellective power, then the intellect will not be able to understand anything about separate substance, because an adequate object includes virtually or formally everything that the power can be made to bear on - but material quiddity contains separate substances neither virtually nor formally,     therefore etc     . - I say that the assumption is not true, because the five common sensibles, namely number, figure, etc., are sensed per se by the sense of sight, which sensibles are not included either virtually or formally under color or light; for it is enough that some things are contents of concomitance.”

²¹Text marked by Scotus with the sign g [n.27].

²²Addition cancelled by Scotus: “because they are not included virtually in the prime object of metaphysics, namely in being.”

²³Interpolation: “A philosopher might say to this reason that what it is impossible for us to know it is not necessary for us to know; but it is impossible for us to have of the properties of separate substances any knowledge, whether by nature or infused, save as we now have it - and     therefore it is not necessary that knowledge be infused for knowledge of the properties of separate substances.”

²⁴Interpolation: “Again, from the motion of the heaven it turns out that the angels are always moving it, nor could the heaven be greater, on account of the labor of the angel doing the moving - so that if one star be added, the angel could not move it etc     ” [Aristotle De Caelo 2.1.284a14-18].

²⁵Text marked by Scotus with the sign e.

²⁶Note by Scotus: “‘Suppose there is someone non-baptized’ etc. see above at the sign o#o.” Interpolation: “But against the principal conclusion, namely that supernatural knowledge is not necessary for man for salvation, one could argue thus.”

²⁷Interpolation [from Appendix A]: “Against the things said, by responding to the question: for he seems to want the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ to be taken chiefly by comparing the receptive power with the act and the form and in no way by comparing it with the agent; he seems also second to want the distinction of natural and supernatural to be taken chiefly by comparing the passive power with the agent and not by comparing it with the act and the form.

Therefore, as to these points, I proceed thus against him: I will show first that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ should be taken by comparison with the agent; second that it should not be taken chiefly by comparison with the act; third that the distinction of natural and supernatural should be taken by comparison with the act and the form and the second causes; fourth I will solve the reasons he has on his behalf.

The first is proved in this way, by the Commentator on De Anima 2 com.26: “Demonstrative definitions are naturally fitted to give causes for everything in the thing defined;” but the violent is defined by comparing the passive power with the agent;     therefore the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ has its place by comparison with the agent. The minor is plain, because “the violent is that whose principle is extrinsic, with the thing suffering the violence contributing nothing” Ethics 3.3.1110b15-17; but the extrinsic principle is the agent; therefore etc     .

Secondly, the same thing is argued thus: that by which certain things differ formally from each other seems to be the formal principle of the distinction between them; but the natural and the violent differ formally by having their principle within and without;     therefore etc     . The minor is proved by Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b20-23 where, in expounding the definition of nature, he says about the same thing: ‘in that in which it is’.”

²⁸Interpolation: “but if there is any supernatural knowledge in the second way, it is supernatural”, or: “if it were to infuse knowledge of this, ‘God is Triune’ or the like, this knowledge would be supernatural.”

²⁹They were prophesying simultaneously during the space of five years (592-587 AD) at the time of the Babylonian captivity.

³⁰“Do you not judge too ill-advisedly of human affairs? The fact that nothing of earth, nothing of fire, nothing finally that reaches the senses of the body, is to be worshipped as God, but one must seek after him with the intellect alone, is not a thing of dispute for a few of the very learned, but is believed and preached even by an unskilled crowd of males and females in as many nations and as diverse.”

³¹Actually a quote from Ps.-Augustine Sermon against Jews, Pagans, and Arians ch.12, which paraphrases the verse of Daniel.

³²Interpolation: “For when handing on his own polity he said: ‘It is expedient for temperance that the more aged have intercourse’ (Politics 7.16.1335a22-23). Again he says that nothing orphaned [deformed] should be nourished (ibid. 1335b20-21). Again he says that, if anyone has generated children beyond what wealth is sufficient for, abortion should be performed before life is perceived, etc. (ibid. 1335b22-25). Tully, De Natura Deorum 1.7.28.”

³³“For in the Catholic Church, setting aside the purest wisdom to the knowledge of which a few spiritual people in this life attain .. .the rest of the crowd, to be sure, is made most safe not by the vivacity of their understanding but by the simplicity of their belief; .many other things there are that most justly hold me in her bosom; the agreement of peoples and nations holds me.”

³⁴Scotus may be thinking of the third battle of Homs that took place in 1299 between the Muslim Mamluks and the Mongols. The prophecy he mentions is also mentioned by others, as by Roger Bacon and William Vorillon.

³⁵More fully: “Or will someone say that these miracles are false and were not done or were deceitfully written down? Whoever says this, if he denies that in these respects any writings are to be believed, he can also say that the gods care nothing for mortal things etc.”

³⁶More fully: “Further if the worshippers of many gods believe magical books, or as they more honorably think, theurgical books, why do they refuse to trust the Writings which say that these things were done, to which books the more trust is due the more he is great above all to whom alone they command that sacrifice should be given?”

³⁷As in particular St. Augustine, Epistle to Paulina, On Seeing God, bk.13 n.31.

³⁸Interpolation: “provided it be clear from the terms that something such is principle.”

³⁹The so called Testimonium Flavianum, whose authenticity has been much disputed, though it is attested in all mss. and is twice cited by Eusebius (AD 263-339); see the Loeb edition of the Antiquities, vol. IX p. 49. An interpolation here contains the relevant passage: “But there was in those same times Jesus, a wise man, if however it is right to call him a man. For he was a worker of marvelous deeds, and a teacher of men, of those who gladly hear things that are true; and many indeed of the Jews, many also of the Gentiles, he joined to himself. This man was Christ. Who, although Pilate, on the accusation of the first men of our nation, decreed he should be crucified, was not deserted by those who from the beginning loved him. For he appeared to them on the third day alive again, in accord with what divinely inspired prophets had foretold, whether this miracle or other innumerable miracles about him. But even to the present day the name and race of Christians, who are named after him, perseveres.”

⁴⁰Interpolation: “Comparing these with the three reasons on which the solution of the preceding question depends [nn.13-18, 40-41], it is plain that Scripture adequately contains the doctrine necessary for the wayfarer.”

⁴¹Origen’s authentic text reads: “No science explains everything that needs to be known, but that from which the other things can be sufficiently drawn.”

⁴²Interpolation: “[without caring] even if [he exposes...]”

⁴³More properly: “But if there is a science per se of each of the causes, certainly the science about the final cause would be the nobler among them.”

⁴⁴More fully: “Certainly I do not attribute to this science everything that can be known about man in human affairs, but only that whereby most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended, strengthened.”

⁴⁵Note by Scotus added before ‘the object’: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object, and, as this is omitted here, say.”

⁴⁶[A note that Scotus cancelled here reads: “but the object is related to the habit as cause to effect; now a cause is not adequate unless it virtually contains the whole effect;     therefore etc     .” The note was cancelled by Scotus because of the addition just made: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object.”]

⁴⁷This opinion of Henry’s is discussed and rejected by Scotus in Metaphysics 6 q.1 nn.3-7.

⁴⁸Note by Scotus: “This is valid against the opinion about Christ;” cf. n.134 above and n.173 below.

⁴⁹Note by Scotus: “Note: valid against the opinion about Christ.”

⁵⁰Interpolation: “But if it is not about eternal things, it does not perfect the superior part of reason.”

⁵¹Interpolation: “because the intellect knowing such an object can draw out every conclusion or concept of that habit.”

⁵²Interpolation: “to wit, the fact that God is three and One does not have evidence from the object known, because we do not know God under the idea of God, but from elsewhere; we believe it because we find it written. Therefore if you then find a written science of geometry, the object of geometry would not then contain the written properties as they are seen by my intellect, because it would not be known to me under the idea of first object; therefore a first object of such a sort should, with respect to such habit, be assigned as the intellect would assign first those truths to.”

⁵³Bonaventure On the Sentences 1 prologue q.1 in corp. (1 7b): “The subject too, to which, as to ‘the integral whole’, all the things determined in this book are reduced is Christ, insofar as he embraces the divine and human nature, or the created and the uncreated, about which are the two first books; and as he is head and members, about which are the two following books. And I take ‘integral whole’ in a broad sense, because it embraces many things not only in composition but in union and in order.”

⁵⁴In the position of Bonaventure, see the previous footnote

⁵⁵Again in the position of Bonaventure.

⁵⁶Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, The Work of Six Days ch.1: “.. .And this is the one subject of this wisdom [theology] which the Savior expresses in John when he says: ‘And that they too may be one in us’. Consider what is said, how the ‘one’ by which we are one with the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit - which is also expressed in John when he says ‘And that they too may be one in us’ - seems to bind together in itself the ‘one’ of the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the ‘one’ of the union of the two natures in the person of Christ, and the ‘one’ whereby we are one in Christ, and ‘one’ by the renewal of the Spirit of our mind with the Supreme Trinity!”

⁵⁷These seven (from the Creed) are: conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, descended into hell, rose again from the dead on the third day, ascended into heaven, will come again to judge the living and the dead.

⁵⁸These seven articles are: I believe in one God, Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, I believe in the Holy Spirit, creator of heaven and earth, forgiveness of sins, resurrection of the body and life everlasting.

⁵⁹Interpolation: “because the artisan works on something, and in that same thing his making is received; by reason of the first is the object said to be the matter in a science, not by reason of the second, because the act of a science does not pass over [sc. into something else].”

⁶⁰Text canceled by Scotus: “because a consideration of attributes naturally known to us is a metaphysical consideration, save when there are some attributes that belong per se only to this essence as this and not to it as it is now naturally known by us, namely confusedly.”

⁶¹Interpolation: “On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same, Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31; if therefore something has principles of knowing then it has principles of being. The principles of being are said not to be complex but in-complex, and from these are formed the propositions which are the principles of knowing; but the first cause lacks a principle of being, though not of knowing, because some things belong to it in a prior way and through these are posterior things known.”

⁶²Interpolation: “because the properties of being that are convertible with being are known supremely about any being, then knowledge of the more nobly distinct properties of a being, which knowledge divides them to the same supreme belonging, is the most noble that can naturally be had of God; but all this knowledge is metaphysics, because that which has the job of considering a property in general about a subject in general has the job of knowing the same property supremely about the same subject in particular.”

⁶³The opinion of Henry of Ghent.

⁶⁴Again the opinion of Henry of Ghent.

⁶⁵Interpolation: “because it alone does not include limitation about any object; but any other one, because it is from a limited cause, necessarily includes limitation.”

⁶⁶Possibly a reference to the teaching of, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas that one cannot have knowledge and faith at the same time about the same thing, as say about the existence of God.

⁶⁷The reference is to man as made in the image of God, as spoken of in particular by Augustine On the Trinity 14 ch.8 n.11, 15 ch.27 n.50.

⁶⁸Interpolation: “on the part of the science, because it is an equivocal effect.”

⁶⁹Interpolation: “On the contrary: in this way God knows other things through his own essence previously first known.”

⁷⁰Interpolation: “The argument is made that God would in that case know discursively, since he understands line and the properties that are virtually included in line. Let it be that God understands line according to the requirements of line; but it is not the case that, because line has such requirement, therefore he has such understanding of it, but rather, because he has such understanding, therefore line requires to be so understood, because his science is cause and measure of the thing. However it is not so with the blessed, because the thing, whether in itself or in the Word, is always the cause of our knowledge.”

⁷¹Interpolation: “because science is a necessarily true habit, thus what remains the same cannot be sometimes true and sometimes false, just as neither can it be sometimes science and sometimes not science, Metaphysics 7.15.1039b31-40a5; therefore it is necessarily of a necessary object, such that necessity is not only the condition of he necessary object, but is rather intrinsic to the habit itself; not indeed that the habit cannot be destroyed by forgetfulness, but that it cannot not be true, just as a statement cannot be false when it remains the same as what was true before. Therefore absolutely there is no science of what is contingent; but there is most perfect knowledge, because vision remains determinately veridical, which vision does not remain when the object is not present in itself the way science remains, wherefore vision does not have the pre-eminence. I say, therefore, that theology is of necessities about a possible, to wit ‘God is creative’, ‘God is capable of assuming our nature’; similarly in the case of practical things, ‘God is to be believed’, ‘God is to be loved’, ‘God is to be worshipped’. But of these practical necessities - besides the third - the conclusions are purely theological, the third is in some way not necessary; just as some matters of speculation are necessary and purely theological, as ‘God is Triune’, others are naturally known.”

⁷²Interpolation: “This about theology in itself. But what about theology of the way? Would it be subalternate if such knowledge were to be given to someone or if it has been given? - To this some say [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] that it is subalternate; for it is subalternate to the science of God and the blessed. - Against this it is argued first in this way: these people say elsewhere that science cannot stand with faith; but, as they say, because it is subalternate, it does stand with faith;     therefore , according to them, it stands and does not stand, so they contradict themselves. - Besides, the science of God can only be single; therefore none can be subalternate. - Besides, science, according to the idea of its cause, depends only on the object or the subject or the light; but the vision of the blessed possesses no idea of cause with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc     . - Besides, a subalternating science is not first about the same truths or the aforesaid known things, because a subalternated science begins there where the subalternating science ends; but this science can be of the same things as is the science of the blessed;     therefore etc     . -Besides, he who has the subalternated science is capable of having the subalternating science; in the proposed case neither of these is possible;     therefore etc     . The major is plain as to both parts: first, because he who has the principles about a conclusion can know the conclusion; the second is likewise plain, because the principles of the subalternating science are more universal and thus, in the order of intellectual cognition, they are known first, because there a second of this sort does not proceed from things more known but from sense. The minor is also plain as to both members: just as the wayfarer cannot see clearly, so neither can the blessed have sense.”

⁷³That is, from ‘if an act is action, then it is an elicited or commanded act of the will’ one asserts ‘understanding is a commanded act of the will’ and then concludes ‘therefore understanding is action’, which is the fallacy of the consequent.

⁷⁴Interpolation: “Note, intellection is either commanded by the will or is directive or not; if it is not, then it is purely speculative; if it is, either it is directive as a logical intention directs an act of discoursing or of denominating (which is an act of the intellect following an act of simple intelligence and an act of forming complexes, which is to combine and divide), and such is still speculative; or it is directive of an act of will, and then it is practical; but it is not praxis in the way it is being taken here, namely not for any operation whatever but for such an operation as the intellect is of a nature to be extended to by taking extension properly.”

⁷⁵Interpolation: “On the contrary: of necessity an act of intellect is prior to an act of will actually, which you set down as the first action. - True, but it does not necessarily follow thereon about the act of will actually that is action.”

⁷⁶Interpolation: “On the contrary: in that case any knowledge would be practical, because on any knowledge there is aptitudinally apt to follow in the will the right volition conform to them which you set down as first action. - One must say that it is not true of volition of a knowable, but of volition of knowledge, and this idea is action. - On the contrary: an aptitude that agrees with one nature and is repugnant to another is not seen save through something intrinsic to it; therefore it is necessary to explain why this conformity to action agrees with this habit and is repugnant to a second. - One must say that this is from its object” [n.252].

⁷⁷Text cancelled by Scotus: “A confirmation of this reason is that some practical knowledge agrees more by essential agreement with some speculative knowledge than one speculative knowledge agrees with another. - On the contrary: the distinction of knowledges by their objects is essential. - I reply: the first distinction, which is according to essential differences, is essential and from the objects as from extrinsic causes, but there can from the same differences be some posterior non-essential distinction.”

⁷⁸Interpolation: “with respect to the same object.”

⁷⁹Text cancelled by Scotus: “if science’s being practical is convertible with science’s being ordered to action as to its end, then moral science is not practical. The consequent is contrary to the Philosopher in Ethics 1.1.1095a5-6, 2.2.1103b26-30. The proof of the consequence is that the end of moral science is happiness, which, according to him in Ethics 10.7.1177a12-b1, 8.1178b7-32, 9.1179a22-32, consists in speculation, not action. - It if be said that happiness is its remote end but that its proximate end is action, namely to direct to acts of virtue for the sake of happiness, on the contrary: it is not necessarily ordered to giving direction except aptitudinally; but it is necessarily practical; therefore it will be this, according to the said response [nn.253-254], because it is aptitudinally ordered to giving direction. But to be practical and to be directive are the same, from the second article [n.237]; therefore from the said response [nn.253-254] it follows that it is practical because it is practical. Again, to direct is an act of intellect, because it is its habit that the act is elicited from; but no act of the intellect is practical, from the first article [nn.228, 232]. Therefore one would be saying in another way that the end of moral science, to which it is ordered, is the act of virtue, just as the end of prudence is as well, - and this act is action.”

⁸⁰Interpolation: “Now when in a previous apprehension there is determination about the rectitude of an action, but when the power of which it is the action is not in any way determinable from elsewhere, then the knowledge, although it is determinate, does not make conform.”

⁸¹Interpolation: “ ‘First act is with respect to the end and is the perfect operation which the will forms within itself and unites itself to the last end; second act is with respect to things that are for the end, hence a good action is that by which the will tends to something else outside itself, just as is any action directive to the end. In the first act the will does not need a directive act but mere showing of the end is sufficient; for there is speculation in it only so as to show perfectly to the will the object of its operation so that it may at once tend to it with a perfect operation. Now such act simply concerns speculative knowledge. In the second act the will needs a directive act, and this pertains to practical knowledge, because there is in it speculation so as to direct action, which is proper to practical knowledge. But the act that is perfected by the will is not the end of this knowledge (unless the end is under an end) but there is another act which perfects the will; and from this fact does this knowledge have its being most perfectly speculative, because the act principally intended in this knowledge is the act of the will about the end, in which it does not need a directive act but only a showing of the object.     Therefore it is not practical knowledge, but only simply speculative knowledge, since in its own principal act it does not need a directive act.’ So Henry of Ghent. ‘For this way’ etc   . [n.271].”

⁸²Text canceled by Scotus: “The blessed cannot err in any act concerning the theological object; therefore they naturally have directive knowledge in respect of any act concerning the theological object.”

⁸³Sc. as opposed to a causing ‘why’. A cause ‘that’ merely makes the effect to exist; a cause ‘why’ gives the effect the nature it has as well. The argument of this paragraph seems to be that since the third way supposes that choice is only action because the effect it causes is action, then the cause is getting its nature from the effect, which is contrary to the relation of cause and effect.

⁸⁴Text cancelled by Scotus: “And given that such necessity is posited in the intellect from the nature of the will that loves God, would he posit necessity thus in the will of the wise man whom he himself posited as naturally happy? If not, then the wise man can be directed in such an act. - I reply: he only denied the practical to such a man because he said his happiness was speculative.”

⁸⁵Text cancelled by Scotus: “For although the Trinity of persons does not show the end to be more desirable than if they were not three (because the Trinity is the end insofar as they are one God, not insofar as they are three), yet a will ignorant of the Trinity can err in loving or desiring the end by desiring to enjoy one person only. Likewise, a will ignorant that God made the world can err by not repaying the sort of love that gratitude would require for so great a communication of his goodness made for our utility. Thus, by being ignorant of the articles pertaining to reparation it is possible to be ungrateful, by not repaying the love due for so great a benefit. So too of other theological articles.”

⁸⁶Interpolation: “and this because of its one subject, which is God, in which come together all the things that are considered in this science. For all of them fall under the consideration of this science insofar as they participate in something divine, and therefore whether it consider them by comparison to work or not, as in the case of purely speculative science, but because of the formal unity of the subject this science is single. - Against this opinion thus: whenever something common is divided first through certain opposite differences, it is impossible for both differences to be found under some one thing contained under that common thing; but science in common is divided first into practical and speculative; therefore it is impossible for these differences to be found together in some one science. The major is manifest, because if differences that jointly divide some common thing could be compatible with each other in something contained in common, then the same body could be corporeal and incorporeal, and the same animal sensible and non-sensible, and the same man rational and irrational, which is absurd. The minor is plain from Avicenna at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1 ch.1 (70ra), and from the Commentator in his first comment on Ethics 1 [Eustratius, I preface (1A)]. Again, a contradiction about one and the same thing would follow, namely that it is extended and not extended, and many other disagreeable results follow. - An addition.”

⁸⁷Interpolation: “To the second [n.326] it can be said that it is not similar, because there is there simple being pleased, but here there circumstanced efficacious willing. Likewise, the divine will is not merely ostensive, but it is at least equivalently directive, because it is an objectual, though not potential, regulation and determination, which the Philosopher did not posit. - To the third [n.327] I say that, if it was conclusive, it would follow that there was neither any intellection nor any volition in God, since the divine essence is the moving object for both, and thus, along with the concurring part, it is a vital power as joint cause; I say therefore that there is only an order of quasi-effects of the same quasi-cause in the proposed case, which order however is not distinct from the quasi-effects, because these effects are neither properly caused nor produced, nor do they have a principle, nor are they elicited, but they simply flow out; the causality therefore is metaphorical, as commonly happens in divine reality. Or in another way, when upholding that the intellect in some way or other directs, the assumption is denied when speaking properly of cause. To the confirmation [n.327] I say that the order of nature suffices, which order stands along with simultaneity in duration of the knowledge for action and of the will for willing, and thus the answer is plain to the arguments, when one upholds the first way.”

⁸⁸Interpolation: “and if of another supposit, then it would be practical, because it would be of the directible or determinable power of the other supposit, namely of the power of some created supposit or other.”